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1.0
Introduction
Like most other central banks, the primary
mandate of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
is to ensure monetary and price stability. This
primacy is shared by four other objectives,
namely: issuing legal tender currency in
Nigeria; maintaining external reserves to
safeguard the international value of the legal
tender currency; promoting a sound financial
system; and acting as banker and providing
economic and financial advice to the Federal
Government. In addition, the Bank has been
ascribed numerous secondary mandates,
complementary to the core ones, including
banking, treasury, and credit operations;
liquidity management; developmental
function; and payment and settlement
systems facilitation, among others.
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Of research interest here is the
developmental function which, without a
doubt, is among the prominent contributions
of the CBN to the economy. A similar function
has increasingly been undertaken by other
central banks, including those in advanced
economies. For instance, in April 2020, the
United States' Federal Reserves introduced
the Mainstreet Lending Program, a US$600
billion credit intervention for small and
medium-sized businesses that were
financially sound before the COVID-19
pandemic. With US$75 billion co-funding
from the US Treasury, the programme
effectively ran from July 2020 to January
2021, providing 1,830 loans valued at
US$17.5 billion to 2,453 borrowers (Bräuning
and Paligorova, 2021; Kolakowski, 2021).
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Abstract
The developmental function is one prominent contribution of
the Central Bank of Nigeria to the Nigerian economy. Routine
reporting of this function focuses on volume of projects
funded, disbursements, and repayments. Exploring the
possibility of expanding the reporting scope, this paper
conceptualized and illustrated handy measures of policy
anchored on macroeconomic aggregates, to track this
function relative to other macroeconomic policy ends.
Descriptive and inferential analyses suggested that the
financial, economic and market intensity measures were quite
responsive to developments in the economy and could be
useful tools for policy reporting purposes. The pricing intensity
indicator suggested distortions in the pricing mechanism. It is
recommended that the pricing of the interventions receive
some look-in by the Bank while the indicators should, still, be
interpreted with caution.

In another instance, the Bank of England
(BoE's) Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS),
initiated in 2012, allowed banks and building
societies to borrow at lower rates from it for a
maximum of four years and increase lending
to households and businesses (Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013). In
2016, it introduced the Term Funding
Scheme (TFS), a four-year funding facility at
interest rates close to the Bank's Base Rate
plus a fee, to participating financial
institutions. Reviews indicated that the
Scheme effectively lowered the mortgage
lending rates (Ginelli Nardi et al, 2018;
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Meertens, 2019). The counter-COVID-19
interventions of the BoE included the Term
Funding Scheme with Additional Incentives
for Small to Mid-size Enterprises (TFSME) and
the COVID Corporate Financing Facility
(CCFF) which was introduced jointly with Her
Majesty's Treasury (BoE, 2020; Mulreany,
2020).

indicators on the broad assumption that the
Bank's multifarious development financing
programmes for micro, small and medium
enterprises (MSMEs) have a dual policy focus
of addressing capital availability (credit
rationing) and affordability (high interest rates
charged by financial institutions). To take
things beyond anecdotal arguments, we
illustrate practical usefulness of these
measures with available data.

The developmental function of the CBN
gathered momentum immediately after the
global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09, when
quantitative easing became an inviting policy
instrument for central banks. As a result, the
Bank's development financing programmes
rose markedly from one in 2009 to about
twenty-four before the onset of the
coronavirus pandemic in late 2019.
Performance in this function is routinely
reported by volume of projects funded,
disbursements repayments, job creation, as
well as capacity utilization, output, and
efficiency improvements in funded
enterprises. This limits an appreciation of the
great depth of work under this function,
leaving no room for perception of its effect on
other policy ends and overall outcomes of the
Bank's work.

From this point forward, the structure of the
paper is as follows: Section Two presents the
proposed policy measures and their
theoretical motivations. Section Three
focuses on methodology for deriving them
while, in Section Four, we illustrate their
application with real life data. Conclusion and
recommendations are in Section Five.
2.0
Conceptual Issues
In proposing new measures of policy for the
developmental function, the intention is to,
directly, connect it to macroeconomic
performance. These measures can be
understood as some sort of intervention
intensity measures quantifying the extent to
which the intervention policies contributed to
macroeconomic outcomes. As a policy tool,
this can be useful in signalling to policy
makers the size and direction of further
intervention, if required, by giving hints about
both policy and the economy. Accordingly,
we propose four measures, namely, financial
intensity, economic intensity, market intensity
and pricing intensity. For each intensity
measure, the ultimate question would be
what the optimum levels or thresholds should
be.
2.1
Financial Intensity
This is an internal measure of the effect of
interventions on the balance sheet of the
central bank itself. It is broadly defined as the
ratio of cumulative intervention
disbursements to total liabilities of the CBN.
The formula is:

Noting the issues of timeliness and
representativeness around qualitative
performance data on the interventions, and
considering that the developmental function
heavily leans on the macroeconomic policy
transmission mechanism usually with lags in
outcomes, how can reporting of this function
be enhanced to provide more insights given
timely available data? In other words, can we
capture how the developmental function
weighs into certain aspects of
macroeconomic performance, and can this
provide signalling for policy decisionmaking?
In this paper, we explore the possibility of
enhancing the reporting of the
developmental function using handy policy
indicators or measures anchored on
macroeconomic aggregates, to further track
this function. Handy because of the consistent
and reliable availability of data to construct
the measures. We conceptualize these

Financial Intensity of Intervention = Cumulative intervention disbursements
Total liabilities of the CBN

(2.1)
Since assets equal liabilities in general, this
measure is as good as being the ratio of
cumulative intervention disbursements to
total assets of the CBN. In effect, this indicator
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measures the implications of the Bank's
development finance intervention policy
instrument on the balance sheet as a
monetary policy instrument.

intervention disbursements proportionate to
annual nominal gross domestic product
(GDP), that is:

The central bank balance sheet is a
convenient monetary policy tool for financial
system stability, especially in periods of
financial distress. In considering balance
sheet policies, emphasis has been on
quantitative easing, credit easing, emergency
lending assistance, changes in the supply of
bank reserves and targeted asset purchases
(Curdia and Woodford, 2010; Caruana 2012;
and Ademuyiwa et al, 2018).

(2.2)
Intervention fund disbursements are credit
facilities. In the classical production function,
these are capital inputs in the production of
the associated output, given their
contribution to current assets (raw materials
and inventories) and fixed assets (capital
goods, also capital formation).

Economic Intensity of Intervention = Annual intervention disbursements
Annual nominal gross domestic product

This measure is motivated by the domestic
credit-to-GDP ratio, that is, private sector
credit to the economy as a proportion of GDP.
Private sector credit has been shown to
promote economic growth (Olowofeso et al,
2015; Amoo et al, 2017). The World Bank
describes domestic credit as financial
resources provided to the private sector by
other depository corporations except central
banks, and includes loans, purchases of nonequity securities, trade credits and other
accounts receivable that create a claim for
repayment. In some countries, it may include
credit to public enterprises.

For Nigeria, Kure et al (2019) found evidence
of the central bank balance sheet as a
monetary policy tool. They concluded that
while the CBN could, in the short- to mediumterm, sustain its intervention programmes on
the economy, the programmes would be
more effective when the Bank became more
of a banker's bank than when it is a
government's bank, as the latter crowded out
private sector growth.
In this context, scaling the intervention
disbursements along this line alludes to the
size of the balance sheet as crucial for
intervention policy. In turn, it traces the
implications of the real sector interventions
on the balance sheet. A significant trend
coefficient for this measure would situate the
direction of evolution of this measure as
increasing, decreasing or stable.

In this context, intervention disbursements
are credits from the CBN to the private sector.
Scaling the disbursements by the GDP is a
representation of the intensity of the
interventions on the economy. How would
the economy respond to this portion of credit
to it? Significant trend, positive correlation
and Granger-causality analyses of this
measure would have a similar interpretation
as in the financial intensity measure. More
importantly, positive or increasing
relationships would imply a boosting of
growth while negative or decreasing mean
otherwise.

Growth in the ratio connotes expansionary
monetary policy due to quantitative easing
effects while a decline means it is
contractionary. A positive correlation of
intervention disbursements with total
liabilities would imply co-movement, where
both go in the same direction. The Grangercausality test would determine the
precedence between them, that is, which of
the two predicts the other.

2.3
Market Intensity
This is a measure of the level of
“complementarity” or “substitution” of the
credit market by the intervention funds. It sets
cumulative intervention disbursements as a
ratio of domestic credit (loans and advances)
to the economy.

2.2
Economic Intensity
This is a measure of the contribution of
interventions to aggregate national output or
national income. It is defined as annual
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Granger-causality is about information
content, temporal relations and precedence,
not about cause-and-effect relationship in the
usual, ordinary understanding of it. A variable
c Granger-causes another variable g if it helps
to predict or forecast it. In this sense, it is
possible to have bi-directional causality,
where each variable predicts the other
(Granger and Newbold, 1977; Hamilton,
1994; Eichler, 2013; Ashley and Tsang, 2014;
Öhman and Yazdanfar, 2017; Maitra, 2019).
The motivation of Ganger-causality is to
determine if lagged values of c would
improve the explanation of current g when
added to past values of g. That is,

Market Intensity of Intervention = Cumulative intervention disbursements
Domestic credit to the economy

CBN's credit to the real sector of the economy
could have a complementary effect to
domestic credit which is, largely, obtained
from other depository corporations. Positive
correlation means complementarity and
stimulation of private investment. On the
other hand, it could be substitutionary, in
which case there is a displacement effect on
private financial institutions' funding to the
economy, something like crowding it out.
2.4

Pricing Intensity

This is a measure of the (percentage points)
difference between:

yt = a0 + a1 yt-1 + .... + a1 yt-i + b1 xt-1 + .... + b1 xt-1 + et
xt =a0 + a1 xt-1 + .... + a1 xt-i + b1 yt-1 + .... + b1 yt-1 +mt

(3.2)
where:

(I) the market prevailing market rates,
precisely the prime lending rate, and the
intervention lending rate, which we will call
the “intervention spread”, calculated as:

r=

S (x-x) (y-y)

yt, x1

= Current values of y and x

a0

= Constant term

a1..., a1 = Coefficients of lagged values of y and x from the 1st to ith lag
yt - 1,..., yt - 1= 1st to ith lagged values of y

S (x-x) 2 S (y-y)2

xt - 1,..., xt - 1= 1st to ith lagged values of x

(3.1)

where
c = Observations for intervention
variable
g = Observations for macroeconomic
aggregate variable
= Mean of intervention variable
= Mean of macroeconomic
aggregate variable
The null hypothesis was a one-tailed test of ¡
not being greater than zero or positive,
against the alternative that it was positive. The
one-tailed test is statistically more powerful
than the two-tailed and was apt for purpose
because both variables were hypothesized to
increase or decrease correspondingly, that is,
the relationship was aptly considered in one
(positive) direction. Some authors suggested,
as a general guide, that if

b1 ...., b2

= 1st to ith Coefficient of y and x in the relevant equation

et, ut

= Error terms in the relevant equation

The tests were conducted at two lags as

permitted by the size of the samples. The null

hypothesis that all the b coefficients in each

equation were jointly equal to zero was tested

by the Wald F-statistics. This is to say that:
b1 = b2 = ... = bi = 0 ...
(3.3)

±0.1≤¡ ≤ ± 0.3, ¡ is small ± 3.1≤¡ ± 5.0, medium; and
±5.1≤¡
± 1.0 large large (see Schober et al,

1) Scaling of relevant intervention variable by
the relevant macroeconomic aggregate
variable, to derive a ratio time series. The
ratios are as defined in (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3).
For the balance sheet and credit to the
economy ratios, the relevant intervention
variable was the cumulative disbursements
while for the GDP, it was the annual
disbursements.

Granger-causality to determine causation in
the relationship between the intervention and
the macroeconomic aggregate variables.

2) Trend analysis to determine the existence
of a linear trend in the ratio series. The
function analyzed was the bivariate
relationship of the time trend and the relevant

2018; Birkett, 2019; Kent State University, 2021).
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(3.5)

ratio. It is given as:

t

g t = bo + b1 trend + et

1

(3.4)

where:

2

Yt =

Dependent variable being relevant

bo =

Constant or intercept term

b1 =

s1

= Standard of the first sample

ratio variable

s1

Coefficient of the trend term

h

the last period in the series

between the two population means equalled

h

= Sample size of the first sample

= Sample size of the second sample

zero, that is, µ1 - µ2 = 0 or µ1 = µ2, and the test

Error term

statistic was evaluated against the t-test

The null hypothesis of no trend was tested by

distribution table values (Bevans, 2020).

the significance of the b1 coefficient. For the

rate variables, analysis proceeded as follows:

4) Trend analysis to determine the existence
of a linear trend in the rate differentials and
real rate series. The function analyzed was a
bivariate relationship of the type in (3.4)
except that the dependent variable was the
spread or the real rate. The same test of
hypothesis applied.

1) Determine the interest rate differential
between the intervention fund interest rate
and weighted prime lending rate, and the real
intervention fund rate being the difference
between the intervention interest rate and the
inflation rate, as in (2.4) and (2.5).

4.0
Results and Discussion
Table 4.1 presents the data. Intervention
disbursements are aggregate disbursements
from existing interventions at any point in
time. Disbursements from the Agribusiness/
Small and Medium Enterprises Investment
Scheme (AGSMEIS) and the Creative Industry
Financing Initiative (CIFI) were excluded from
the study since these programmes were not
funded from the CBN's balance sheet.
Domestic credit is the sum of commercial and
microfinance banks' loans and advances.

2) Graphical analysis of the spread and the
real intervention rate.
3) t-test of difference between means to
determine whether the intervention spread
and the real intervention rate were significant
percentage differences that justified the
interventions. The independent t-test
assuming unequal variance was applied
because, although the two samples were of
the same size (number of observations), their
variances were assumed to be unequal as
they were drawn from different populations. It
is given as:
x1-x2

t=

= Standard of the second sample

The null hypothesis was that the difference

trend = Trend variables (values from 1 to n,
et =

= statistic
= Mean of the first sample
= Mean of the second sample

s +s
n n
2
1

1

2
2

2

Table 4.1: Intervention and Macroeconomic Data
Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Intervention Disbursements
CBN
Annual
Cumulative Liabilities
288.45
304.34
8,767.69
232.47
536.81 16,750.71
100.56
637.37 20,680.45
106.70
722.40 15,062.62
120.25
866.19 14,583.36
249.98
1,088.57 16,492.27
253.12
1,326.93 24,738.62
401.49
1,700.11 33,944.93
1,033.93
2,733.95 40,673.93

Domestic
Credit

Nominal
GDP

7,706.48
7,312.78
8,150.12
10,005.69
12,889.53
13,086.39
16,117.40
15,740.79
15,417.68

54,612.26
62,980.40
71,713.94
80,092.56
89,043.62
94,144.96
101,489.49
113,711.63
127,736.83

Rate
Intervention Prime Lending Ination
9.00
17.59
13.80
9.00
16.02
10.90
9.00
16.79
12.20
9.00
16.72
8.50
9.00
16.55
8.00
9.00
16.85
9.00
9.00
16.87
15.60
9.00
17.58
16.50
9.00
16.72
12.10

Sources: CBN Annual Report (various years); CBN Statistical Bulletin 2019; National Bureau of Statistics. N/B: All monetary values are in
billion and rate values in per cent.
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usually the lowest of the market lending rates,
hence its choice as reference for this study.

Annual aggregate disbursements declined in
2012 but steadily increased from 2013. The
quantum leap in 2018 was a result of
significant increase in disbursements in the
Anchor Borrowers' Programme (ABP) and the
Nigerian Bulk Electricity Trading - Payment
Assurance Facility (NBET-PAF), as well as the
introduction of six programmes, viz, Shared
Agent Network Expansion Facility (SANEF);
CBN-BOI Industrial Facility (CBIF); Non-Oil
Export Stimulation Facility (NESF); Export
Development Facility (EDF); and the Real
Sector Support Facility using Differentiated
Cash Reserve Ratio (RSSF-DCRR).

4.1
Financial Intensity
The Pearson correlation coefficient between
the cumulative intervention disbursements
and the total liabilities of the CBN was +0.93,
suggesting extremely high association and
co-movement. This was expected because
the interventions were quantitative easing
instruments that should result in balance
sheet expansion, other factors held constant.
In their absence or reduction, liabilities should
reduce.

Total liabilities of the CBN increased from
2010 to 2012, declined for two consecutive
years, and had been on the increase since
2015. Domestic credit and nominal GDP
increased throughout the review period while
there were movements in both directions in
sub-samples for prime lending and the
inflation rates. The prime lending rate is

However, Granger-causality test for the
adjusted sample size of 7 observations (Table
4.2) indicated no precedence between the
variables as the probabilities were at 17.67
and 11.23 per cent, respectively. These were
higher than the permissible 5 per cent test
level of significance set for the null hypothesis
test.

Table 4.2: Granger-causality Test Results for Financial Intensity Measure
FNull Hypothesis

Obs

Statistic

Prob.

Total liabilities do not “predict” cumulative disbursements

7

4.6603

0.1767

7.9015

0.1123

Cumulative disbursements do not “predict” total liabilities
Source: Authors' calculations

evolution of the measure showed its lowest at
3.1 per cent and highest at 6.7 per cent. This
small contribution of interventions to the
balance sheet growth and the narrow range
could partly explain the non-prediction
(Figure 4.1).

That the CBN's balance sheet size does not
predict the disbursement proﬁle in its real
sector interventions and vice versa suggested
that, although both moved in the same
direction, they had stronger determinants
other than each other. Furthermore, the
8.0%
7.0%

y = 0.0041 x 0.0285
R2 = 0.6489

6.0%
5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Figure 4.1: Financial Intensity of the Developmental Function
raised the intervention proﬁle relative to the
balance sheet, as the highest intensities were
registered in both years. Practically, more of
the Bank's resources were used in those years
compared to other years.

Clearly, the introduction of the ABP in 2015,
and the combined effect of introduction of
numerous interventions and huge leaps in
ABP and NBET-PAF disbursements in 2018,
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of 12.94 and probability of less than 0.88 per
cent (Table 4.3).

The trend analysis returned a signiﬁcant trend
coefﬁcient of 0.0041, with the F-statistic value

Constant
0.0285

Trend
coefﬁcient
0.0041***

F-statistic
12.9395

Adjusted
R2
0.7548

R2

Prob.
0.0088

0.6489

Source: Authors' calculations. N/B: *** is signiﬁcance at 1 per cent.

intervention disbursements and the GDP
could be described as robust. They changed
correspondingly. In Table 4.4, the Grangercausality test rejected the null hypothesis of
no prediction from nominal GDP to annual
disbursements, the probability being 2.3 per
cent given the signiﬁcant F-statistic of 42.3.
The reverse null hypothesis of prediction from
intervention disbursements to GDP could not
be rejected.

This implied an upward or increasing trend of
intervention with respect to the utilization of
the balance sheet. Hence, to a reasonable
extent, the ﬁnancial measure is useful for
tracking intervention effects on the balance
sheet policies of the Bank.
4.2
Economic Intensity
With a Pearson correlation coefﬁcient of
+0.68, the relationship between the annual

Table 4.4: Granger-causality Test Results for Economic Intensity Measure
Null Hypothesis
Nominal GDP does not “predict” annual disbursements

Obs

F-Statistic

Prob.

7

42.3072**

0.0231

1.3272

0.4297

Annual disbursements do not “predict” nominal GDP
Source: Authors' calculations. N/B: ** is signiﬁcance at 5 per cent, respectively.

in formulating the real sector ﬁnancing
interventions. This is empirically informative
as it conﬁrmed that intervention policies were
guided by developments in the economy
through analytical thought processes.

This interesting result suggested that current
and past levels of national income or
aggregate output provided feedback which
policymakers at the CBN often responded to,

A temporal graph of the economic measure showed its lowest and highest intensities at 0.13
and 0.81 per cent, respectively, in 2013 and 2018.
20.0%
18.0%
16.0%

y = 0.0112 x 0.0306
R2 = 0.6442

14.0%
12.0%
10.0%
8.0%
6.0%
4.0%
2.0%
0.0%

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Figure 4.3: Market Intensity of the Developmental Function
and was responsible for the increased
With stability beginning to return after the
intensity of interventions from that time. In
GFC, the 2010-2011 period saw declining
particular, the Bank pursued improvement in
intensity of intervention relative to GDP.
domestic supply of rice, ﬁsh, sugar, and
Between 2012 and 2014, intensity was stable.
wheat, four commodities which were
However, the economic recession of 2016/17
estimated to have a combined import bill of
attracted increased intervention funding
about N1.3 trillion annually (CBN, 2019).
evidently intended to reﬂate the economy
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dominance of cycles, business/economic
cycle effects, over the trend effects.

Table 4.5 did not indicate the existence of a
trend in the measure, further conﬁrming the

Table 4.5: Trend Analysis of the Economic Intensity Measure
Constant Trend coefﬁcient
0.0021

0.0002

F-statistic

Prob.

R2

Adjusted R2

0.6593

0.4435

0.0861

-0.0445

Source: Authors' calculations.

Other results suggested no causality in the
predictive sense, either way (Table 4.6). That
is, there was neither inference that current
and prior intervention disbursements
increased domestic credit, nor did CBN's
current and previous intervention funding
motivate private sector lending. Could it be
that the intervention policies were not being
effectively transmitted through the private
ﬁnancial institutions? Where does the
intervention funding go? Who gets it? The
results still gave some clues to answer these
questions.

This outcome suggested that the measure
would be useful for reporting on the
developmental function.

4.3
Market Intensity
The strength of association between
cumulative intervention disbursements and
domestic credit was a sizeable +0.79. That
connoted a complementary, non-disruptive
relationship. Of course, the entire volume of
intervention disbursements gets directly
funnelled into the quantum of credit provided
domestically. So, this co-movement was
expected.

Table 4.6: Granger-causality Test Results for Market Intensity Measure
Null Hypothesis
Domestic credit does not “predict” annual disbursements
Annual disbursements do not “predict” domestic credit

Obs
7

F-Statistic
1.1653

Prob.
0.4618

5.8466

0.1461

Source: Authors' calculations

of enterprises. Their loans to small-scale
enterprises (the SMEs) as a percentage of
their total loans for the study period, was
lowest at 0.07 per cent in 2016 and 2017 – in
the thick of the recession! – and highest at
0.29 per cent in quarter four of 2018 (CBN,
2019b). If data were separately available for
micro enterprises, this proportion would even
be lower, given their poor attraction to
commercial banks.

It was believed that, when the level of
domestic credit to certain sectors, such as
agriculture, was below optimum for growth,
the CBN tended to intervene through
ﬁnancing options to support those sectors.
That implied additional credit to the economy
based on prior information about the level of
domestic credit. This would increase the
intensity measure, keeping private sector
credit, which constituted the highest
proportion of domestic credit, constant. By
this thinking, the results should have
indicated that current and past levels of
domestic credit predicted current CBN's
intervention funding. That the results
suggested otherwise demand further
examination.

So, the intensity measure just conﬁrmed that
CBN's interventions stayed true to course,
providing increased access to ﬁnance for
underserved and unserved MSMEs, while
private sector credit continued to target other
economic units (e.g., large enterprises and
government) but MSMEs. This market
segmentation, possibly, explained the comovement without Granger causality and,
a l s o , w h y t h e re w a s n o s u b s t i t u t i v e
relationship between both aggregates.

Now, CBN's interventions mostly focused on
MSMEs. On the other hand, commercial
banks, from where the bulk of domestic credit
emanates, did not focus on these categories
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market. The rapid increase from 2016 to 2018
was in line with implementation of counterrecession initiatives for this period.

Market intensity of intervention rose from 4.0
per cent in 2010 to 18.0 per cent in 2018, as in
Figure 4.3, hinting at increasing importance
of the Bank's interventions in the credit
0.90%
0.80%
0.70%
0.60%
0.50%

y = 0.0002 x 0.0021
R2 = 0.0861

0.40%
0.30%
0.20%
0.10%
0.00%

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Figure 4.2: Economic Intensity of the Developmental Function

2015

2016

2017

2018

private sector credit, implying that it drove
the trend. Rapidly expanding intervention
funding is indicative of an economy that was
operating below optimum credit levels and
urgently required stimulation which the
quantitative easing policy afforded.

There was a signiﬁcant positive trend in
market intensity, as shown in Table 4.7, with Fstatistic of 12.7 and level of signiﬁcance of
0.92 per cent. This simply meant that
although the two were increasing,
intervention funding was rising faster than

Table 4.7: Trend Analysis of the Market Intensity Measure

Constant Trend coefﬁcient F-statistic
0.0306
0.0112***
12.6725

Adjusted R2
Prob.
R2
0.0092 0.6442
0.5933

Source: Authors' calculations. N/B: *** is signiﬁcance at 1 per cent.

intervention rate as deﬁned in (2.4) and (2.5),
respectively. As stated a priori, the variability
in both was wholly due to variations in the
market interest and the inﬂation rates since
the intervention lending rate remained
constant throughout the study period. This
was a concerning reason whether this
measure would be useful for policy decisions.

The market intervention intensity seemed a
good measure of the developmental function
as well, fairly tracking credit market
developments relative to CBN's intervention
funding.
4.4
Pricing Intensity
Figure 4.4 shows the spread and the real
10.00
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6.00

R2 = 0.0202

4.00
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y = 0.2883x -1.4028
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Real Interv. Rate

Figure 4.4: Pricing Intensity of the Developmental Function

Table 4.8, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant trends in the
rates, although trend coefﬁcients conﬁrmed
positive and negative developments in
respective rates.

Spread was all-positive and lowest in 2011
(7.02 per cent), a year after it was highest at
8.59 per cent. It was almost ﬂat, with neither
trend nor cyclical pattern observable. Real
intervention rate was mostly negative. From
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Table 4.8: Trend Analysis of the Financial Intensity Measure
Function

Spread
Real Intervention Rate

Constant
7.7284
-1.4028

Trend
coefﬁcient
0.0252
-0.2883

Fstatistic
0.1439
0.5005

Prob.
0.7155
0.5021

R2
0.0202
0.0667

Adjusted
R2
-0.1198
-0.0666

Source: Authors' calcula ons.

both the spread and the real intervention rate
were much lower than or equal to 0.05. For
the spread, test statistic was 48.59, which was
larger than the critical one- and two-tailed
statistics of about 1.86 and 2.31, resulting in
probabilities of 1.80E-11 and 3.61E-11 per
cent, respectively. These results indicated
extremely high significant spread. The test
statistic for the real rate was -2.79, with oneand two-tailed probabilities of 1.2 and 2.3 per
cent, respectively.

Analyses of the differences between the
means by the t-test determined that they
were significantly different from each other
(Table 4.9). Note that the mean difference
test between the intervention rate and the
prime lending rate was a test of significance of
the spread (Panel A) while that between the
intervention rate and the inflation rate was a
test for the real intervention rate (Panel B).
Probabilities of either one- or two-tail tests for
Table 4.9: t= test of Differences Between Means
Difference
Rate
Mean
Variance
t Stat
Prob. (one-tail)
t Critical (one-tail)
Prob. (two-tail)
t Critical (two-tail)

Panel A
Panel B
Spread
Real intervention rate
Prime lending Intervention Intervention Inﬂation
16.83
9.0
9.0
11.84
0.24
0
0
9.34
48.5097***
-2.7917**
1.8040E-11
0.0117
1.8595
3.6080E-11
0.0234
2.3060

Source: Authors' compilations. N/B: Observations = 9; degrees of freedom = 8; ** and *** are signiﬁcance at 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.

developments, to rake in higher returns. Since
the CBN kept expanding its interventions at
the same time to its target end-users
(MSMEs), this further explained why there was
no substitutive relationship between CBN
intervention funding and domestic credit.

Source: Authors' compilations. N/B:
Observations = 9; degrees of freedom = 8; **
and *** are significance at 5 and 1 per cent,
respectively.
Impliedly, the reduced cost of capital induced
by the spread translated to significant
reduction in cost of production for MSMEs.
Borrowing from intervention funds, invariably,
led to enhanced firm profitability. For financial
institutions, the spread represented
significant opportunity cost of capital
forgone, even though the funds were similarly
obtained at significantly discounted costs
from the CBN. Their lower preference for the
intervention funds for on-lending purposes
was, therefore, not far-fetched. The
institutions simply lent more from their own
balance sheet to their target market
recipients at competitive interest rates with
wider spread which mirrored consumer price

F ro m t h e re a l r a t e p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e
implications were more straightforward.
Fisher hypothesized that the real rate does
not change much, and inflation expectations
are matched by adjustments in the nominal
rate. In this case, and contrary to the Fisher
Effect, the nominal rate, which was the
intervention rate, was fixed, leaving all
changes traceable to inflation. This resulted in
low and negative real intervention rate which,
in effect, significantly disincentivized them to
lend under the interventions. On the other
hand, MSMEs were significantly incentivized
to borrow because as inflation rose, they were
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bound to repay effectively lower amounts in
real terms.

measures were generally responsive to
developments in the macroeconomy,
although they should be interpreted with
caution.

It can be concluded that the pricing intensity
measure aptly captured developments
around prices.

Given the findings under the market intensity
measure, it would be worthwhile to
determine, with survey evidence, if the
interventions mostly served the MSME
m a r k e t a s i n t e n d e d . M o re o v e r, i t i s
recommended that the pricing aspect of the
intervention policy receive another critical
look-in by the Bank. Could the intervention
rate be made inflation-adjustable? And, if so,
is it possible to have a mix of interventions
where each programme is driven by a single
instrument rather than a combination?
Providing wholesale funds for on-lending and
simultaneously capping the intervention rate,
in the same programme, makes it difficult to
trace the origins of policy impact using the
proposed indicators. The renewed emphasis
on minimum loans-to-deposit ratio policy is
analogous to this thinking and is in the right
direction.

5.0
Conclusion and Recommendations
We proposed and illustrated some new
perspectives to reportage of the
developmental function of the CBN. These
are policy tracking measures steeped in
relevant economic thoughts and anchored on
macroeconomic aggregates, which we
believe could provide further insights into the
conduct of real sector intervention policy.
They are financial, economic, market and
pricing intensity measures, and were
conceptualized on the assumption that the
Bank's developmental function has a dual
policy focus of addressing capital availability
and affordability.
The financial intensity measure spoke to an
accommodative stance between the CBN's
balance sheet policies and its developmental
function. The economic intensity measure
exhibited potentials of being either a leading
or lagging economic indicator because of its
precise economic cycle tracking properties.
The market intensity indicator suggested no
distortionary effects of the interventions on
the credit market size and seemed to confirm
MSMEs as the major beneficiaries of CBN's
interventions. The measure for pricing
intensity showed significant distortions to the
market pricing mechanism but highlighted
the overwhelming importance of the interest
rate policies for MSMEs. Overall, the

The Bank should consider pegging its
intervention rate to its anchor rate, the
monetary policy rate. This, again, has its
drawback of being administratively- rather
than market-determined. However, it shifts
the goalposts a little wider for more
participation by financial institutions in the
interventions, by raising the real rate,
reducing the unappealing spread, and freeing
resources from the implicit subsidy in the
intervention rate regime. In the
circumstances, this would appear the Pareto
optimal intervention interest rate.
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